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LAWYERS’ DEMOCRATIC DYSFUNCTION
Leah Litman*
ABSTRACT
As part of the symposium on Jack Balkin and Sandy Levinson’s Democracy and
Dysfunction, this Article documents another source of the dysfunction that the authors
observe—elite lawyers’ unwillingness to break ranks with other elite lawyers who
participate in the destruction of various norms that are integral to a well-functioning
democracy. These network effects eliminate the possibility of “soft” sanctions on norm
violators such as withholding future professional advancement. Thus, rather than
enforcing norms and deterring norm violations, the networks serve to insulate norm
violators from any meaningful accountability.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
II.
III.
IV.

Introduction .............................................................................................303
Enhanced Interrogations ..........................................................................308
Family Separations ..................................................................................315
Lawyers and Democratic Dysfunction ....................................................318

I. INTRODUCTION
Something is rotten in the United States.1 Over the last several years,
academics and commentators from across the political spectrum have expressed
varying degrees of concern about the health of the U.S. political system.2 Sandy
Levinson and Jack Balkin’s recently released book,
Democracy and Dysfunction, makes clear that the authors also harbor significant

* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. Thanks to Don Herzog,
Sandy Levinson, and David Pozen for helpful comments and conversations, and to Widad Diab
(University of California, Irvine School of Law), Jared Looper (University of Michigan Law
School), and Thomas Multari (University of California, Irvine School of Law) for helpful
research assistance.
1. Cf. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 1, sc. 4.
2. See generally Aziz Huq & Tom Ginsburg, How We Lost Constitutional Democracy,
in CAN IT HAPPEN HERE? AUTHORITARIANISM IN AMERICA 135 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2018);
Aziz Huq & Tom Ginsburg, How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy, 65 UCLA L. REV. 78,
105–06 (2018); Richard Primus, The Republic in Long-Term Perspective, 177 U. MICH. L. REV.
ONLINE 1, 22–23 (2018).
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misgivings, if not fears, about the state of our constitutional republic.3
Democracy and Dysfunction documents Levinson and Balkin’s
correspondence over a period of several years, spanning the lead up to and first
year of the Donald J. Trump presidency. The exchanges between the two focus
primarily on diagnosing our constitutional system’s ailments, although some cover
possible solutions.4 Levinson maintains that much of our political dysfunction is
attributable to the Constitution itself.5 He explains that the Constitution’s systems
for apportioning representation in the Senate and choosing presidents are both
deeply undemocratic and skew political incentives in nefarious ways.6 Balkin, on
the other hand, focuses more on subconstitutional defects, such as the difficulty of
voting in the United States as well as the structure of mass media.7
In this short symposium piece, I suggest there is another contributing force
to the kinds of dysfunction that both of the authors observe. My addition is a
friendly amendment to Balkin and Levinson’s diagnoses because the dynamic I
describe could facilitate dysfunction that is attributable to the Constitution itself or
to subconstitutional forces. The dynamic relates to a point that Levinson made in
one of the authors’ exchanges. Levinson wrote: “I supported the filibuster of
Justice Gorsuch’s nomination to the Supreme Court, even as I knew it would be
fruitless,
because I saw no reason for the Democrats to be ‘good sports’ with regard to
stealing the seat that might well/should have gone to Merrick Garland.”8
This passage is illuminating because it conveys Levinson’s fear that the
Democrats will collaborate with President Trump and be “good sports” when it
comes to judicial nominations. Levinson seems to view his own hope that
Democrats will not cooperate as evidence of a defect in our constitutional order:
“[T]he Constitution makes it so very difficult to achieve a genuine governing
3. SANFORD LEVINSON & JACK M. BALKIN, DEMOCRACY AND DYSFUNCTION 2 (2019).
4. Balkin and Levinson suggest many different categorizations for antidemocratic trends,

including constitutional rot and constitutional crises. Id. at 73–82, 106–13 (distinguishing
constitutional rot from constitutional crisis).
5. See id. at 2.
6. Id. at 12–13, 45–50. This point is in keeping with Levinson’s previous work. See
generally SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (2d ed. 2011); CYNTHIA LEVINSON &
SANFORD LEVINSON, FAULT LINES IN THE CONSTITUTION: THE FRAMERS, THEIR FIGHTS, AND
THE FLAWS THAT AFFECT US TODAY (2017); SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED: AMERICA’S 51
CONSTITUTIONS AND THE CRISIS OF GOVERNANCE (2012); SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR
UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE
PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006).
7. See LEVINSON & BALKIN, supra note 3, at 29, 51–53.
8. Id. at 121.
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coalition that can, well, govern.”9
I think this passage calls to mind something else—the inability of social and
professional networks, and particularly elite lawyers, to hold their members
accountable for facilitating the breakdown of norms that are integral to our
constitutional system. Although political polarization makes it difficult for
legislators to cooperate across the aisle, the network of elite lawyers still finds
common ground with one another. This group likes to be “good sports” with one
another.10 Elite circles of the legal profession seem deeply uncomfortable with
doing anything that might hold other elite lawyers accountable for their disregard
of various norms or principles. And the legal network’s unwillingness to hold its
members accountable for breaching these norms partially contributes to the kind
of dysfunction that Levinson and Balkin observe.11
Consider some of the norms that the authors maintain are important to a
functional system of constitutional governance: norms of political participation
(such as allowing political opponents to vote) and norms related to political
responsiveness (such as allowing the winners of an election to assume power or
ensuring elections remain sufficiently democratic and responsive to the popular
will).12 Levinson and Balkin express concern about antidemocratic measures, such
as voter suppression, that undermine these norms.13
Various elite lawyers have participated in these antidemocratic measures,
and the network of elite lawyers has been unwilling to sanction them for it. That
unwillingness eliminates one possible mechanism for upholding and enforcing
these norms and others like them. The elite network’s discomfort with holding its
members accountable for breaching norms shares some parallels with the parallel
and overlapping phenomenon of being uncomfortable with calling someone a
racist or with identifying racial discrimination by name.14 The hesitation to call
someone or something racist sometimes stems from a feeling that calling someone
a racist is as bad as being racist.15 It is a strange idea, but it shows up in media
9. Id. at 122.
10. I will focus, in this Article in particular, on elite lawyers who identify as progressive

being good sports.
11. This claim does not depend on the legal force of the arguments for or against breaking
a particular norm or whether a particular action is legal or illegal. It focuses more on whether a
lawyer is advocating for a course of conduct that is destructive to the functioning of a political
democracy (such as suppressing votes) or is immoral (such as separating families to cause pain).
12. See LEVINSON & BALKIN, supra note 3, at 70–73.
13. See, e.g., id. at 136–37.
14. John Blake, The Polite Way to Call Someone a Racist, CNN (Sept. 29, 2018),
http://cnn.com/2018/09/29/us/polite-racism/index.html [https://perma.cc/K5FH-KEKS].
15. Id.
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coverage, which often describes racism as racially tinged rather than as racist.16 It
appears in politics, where leaders balk at criticizing other politicians for being
racist.17 And it has shaped legal doctrines as well, including courts’ reluctance to
say that government decisionmakers have acted on the basis of racism.18
Both the discomfort with holding elite lawyers accountable for participating
in the breakdown of important norms and the discomfort with identifying racists
result in a zone of unaccountability.19 When social or professional networks refuse
to hold their members accountable for their actions, the networks lose the ability
to function as meaningful safeguards against the breakdown of norms.20 If
anything,
the
existence
of
these
networks makes it more difficult to protect the relevant norms—since the

networks make it difficult to criticize people within the network who violate the
norms.21
The phenomenon of elite loyalty relates to the problem of political
polarization that Balkin and Levinson write about.22 The two phenomena are
similar insofar as political polarization makes it harder for the member of one
political camp to reject a political ally who participated in the destruction of a
norm.23 But the two phenomena are different because political polarization does
16. Julia Craven, Media Euphemisms for ‘Racist’ Are Stupidly Tinged, HUFFINGTON POST
(Jan.
12,
2018),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/media-trump-shitholeracist_n_5a58f0dee4b04f3c55a23a07?guccounter=1 [https://perma.cc/T9YD-7HC6]; Marina
Fang, Journalists Should Call Something Racist When It’s Racist, Associated Press Says,
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 29, 2019), https://www.huffpost.com/ entry/journalism-racist-racismreports_n_5c9e6245e4b0bc0daca861d7 [https://perma.cc/ 3ZLA-R699].
17. Paul Kane & Ed O’Keefe, Republicans Vote to Rebuke Elizabeth Warren, Saying She
Impugned
Sessions’s
Character,
WASH.
POST
(Feb.
8,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2017/02/07/republicans-vote-torebuke-elizabeth-warren-for-impugning-sessionss-character/; Jessica A. Levinson, Snow White
Was Flawed, and Other Truths About Rep. Ilhan Omar, HILL (Aug. 19, 2019),
https://thehill.com/opinion/white-house/457938-snow-white-was-flawed-and-other-truth
sabout-rep-ilhan-omar [https://perma.cc/H5FX-DCDD].
18. See infra text accompanying notes 98–108.
19. See infra text following note 29 for definition.
20. See Fang, supra note 16.
21. See Joseph Fishkin & David E. Pozen, Asymmetric Constitutional Hardball, 118
COLUM. L. REV. 915, 959 (2018).
22. See id. at 958–59.
23. Political polarization makes the idea of giving the opposing political side a win—and
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not explain why individuals who identify with the opposite political party are
unwilling to criticize a person who facilitated the breakdown of a norm.24 That
behavior, instead, might plausibly be attributable to the network effects of
belonging to a particularly small subset of the lawyerly community.25 Being a
member of the small group of elite lawyers leads to familiarity with other members
of the group, which makes it harder to view those fellow members as a destructive
force in the world. Familiarity and insularity raise the stakes of uncomfortable
dynamics within the group, and being a member of a network facilitates
codependence on other network members and even an expectation of reciprocated
loyalty. Together, these incentives create professional and personal pressures to
stick by other members of the elite network of lawyers, including lawyers who
have facilitated the destruction of important constitutional norms and thereby
undermined a healthy, democratic constitutional order.26
Part II of this Article lays the groundwork for the idea that lawyers who
participate in the destruction of important constitutional norms or principles
will never face meaningful accountability from other lawyers. Part II discusses the
case study of former officials in the George W. Bush Administration who
participated in the now-discredited enhanced interrogation (i.e., torture) program.
Part
III
shows
something
similar
is
already happening with the Trump Administration officials who participated in the
forced separation of families.27 There are already ongoing efforts to rehabilitate
those officials, and in some cases, the lawyers involved in the program have
already been promoted to other jobs.28 These case studies suggest that the
community of elite lawyers is either unwilling or unable to discipline members for
participating in the breakdown of our constitutional order.29 (For purposes of this
Article, discipline or sanction means only withholding certain future government
appointments and promotions from the lawyers—not imposing criminal sanctions
or removing them from their current jobs or pursuing actions such as disbarment.
Discipline or sanction might involve some degree of social shunning to the extent
abandoning someone on one’s own political team—less appealing than it would be in a world
without political polarization. See generally Jay J. Van Bavel & Andrea Pereira, The Partisan
Brain: An Identity-Based Model of Political Belief, 22 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 213 (2018).
24. Cf. id. at 214–15.
25. See Thomas Baumgartner, Lorenz Götte, Rahel Gügler & Ernst Fehr, The Mentalizing
Network Orchestrates the Impact of Parochial Altruism on Social Norm Enforcement, 33 HUM.
BRAIN MAPPING 6, 1453 (2011) (outlining the phenomenon of parochial altruism, which the
authors define as “a preference for altruistic behavior towards ingroup members”).
26. See id. at 1467; see also Pozen & Fishkin, supra note 21, at 923.
27. See infra Part III.
28. See infra Part III.
29. See infra Parts II, III.
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that withholding public support counts as social shunning. But here, the terms refer
only to withholding certain governmental appointments that amount to
promotions.) Part IV concludes with some reflections about how this ethos of
unaccountability appears in constitutional jurisprudence and why it is destructive
to our constitutional order.
The important point is not whether the specific decisions the lawyers made
or the policies they defended are lawful or were lawful. Some perfectly lawful
policies might nonetheless be morally abhorrent and destructive to a functional
system of governance. Restricting the franchise and suppressing voter turnout
might be legal (at least in some instances), but it is nonetheless antidemocratic.
The President asking a foreign government to investigate a political opponent in
order to politically and personally benefit the President (particularly when the
country needs U.S. foreign aid or military assistance) may or may not violate
federal election laws,30 but it is nonetheless deeply antithetical to a functioning
system
of
government.
Asking
only
whether
something is illegal minimizes the potential stakes and obscures equally
significant—if not more significant—issues.
II. ENHANCED INTERROGATIONS
In response to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the Bush
Administration launched several morally and legally dubious programs.31 Among
them were the Administration’s use of so-called enhanced interrogation techniques
on detainees who were held at Abu Ghraib prison or at various black sites outside
of the United States.32 At the time, human rights experts argued that the enhanced
interrogation techniques met accepted definitions of torture under international
30. See Letter from Whistleblower to Sen. Richard Burr, Chairman, Select Comm. on
Intelligence, and Rep. Adam Schiff, Chairman, Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence (Aug.
12,
2019),
https://intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/20190812__whistleblower_complaint_unclass.pdf [https://perma.cc/263C-PNZP] [hereinafter Letter from
Whistleblower]; see also Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Trump,
U.S., and President Zelenskyy, Ukr. (July 25, 2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2019/09/Unclassified09.2019.pdf [htt ps://perma.cc/69YS-TGYP].
31. Amna Akbar & Rupal Oza, “Muslim Fundamentalism” and Human Rights in an Age
of Terror and Empire, in GENDER, NATIONAL SECURITY AND COUNTER TERRORISM: HUMAN
RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE 152 (Margaret L. Satterthwaite & Jayne C. Huckerby eds., 2013); Amna
Akbar, National Security’s Broken Windows, 62 UCLA L. REV. 834, 842–44 (2015); Shirin
Sinnar, The Lost Story of Iqbal, 105 GEO. L.J. 379, 383 (2016); Shirin Sinnar, Note, Patriotic
or Unconstitutional? The Mandatory Detention of Aliens Under the USA Patriot Act, 55 STAN.
L. REV. 1419, 1420–21 (2003).
32. S. Rep. No. 113-288, at 97, 133–34, 175 n.1054 (2014).
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law; they also criticized the programs on moral grounds.33 Scores of lawyers were
involved in these programs: They developed the legal justifications and defenses
for enhanced interrogation, including bolstering the questionable idea that torture
generates reliable information.34
Around the time that the programs were discovered, and especially after the
justifications for the programs were discredited with the benefit of hindsight, there
were calls to sanction the officials involved. Websites argued that the lawyers
involved in the program should be prosecuted or disbarred.35 Op-eds in major
newspapers maintained that they “corrupted the law . . . g[a]ve cover to existing
and plainly illegal policies,” and “authorized unspeakable acts.”36 Other op-eds
called for the lawyers to be prosecuted,37 disbarred,38 or shunned by “Congress,

33. Curtis Bradley, The Bush Administration and International Law: Too Much
Lawyering and Too Little Diplomacy, 4 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 57, 71–72 (2009);
Michael P. Scharf, International Law and the Torture Memos, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 321,
345, 447 (2009); Those Who Authorize and Use CIA “Enhanced” Interrogation Tactics Risk
Criminal Prosecution, PHYSICIANS HUM. RTS. (Aug. 2, 2007), https://phr.org/news/those-whoauthorize-and-use-cia-enhanced-interrogation-tactics-risk-criminal-prosecution/
[https://perma.cc/PBP6-QDTF].
34. See infra text accompanying notes 47–56 (describing Justice Neil Gorsuch’s role in
legitimating and legalizing the Bush Administration’s torture regime).
35. See Kenneth J. Theisen & Stephanie Tang, The Truth About Torture: Why John Yoo
Should
Be
Fired,
Disbarred,
and
Prosecuted,
WORLD
CAN’T
WAIT!,
http://www.worldcantwait.net/index.php/97-organizers/kenneth-theisen/5767-the-truthabout-torture-why-john-yoo-should-be-fired-disbarred-and-prosecuted
[https://perma.
cc/9T6J-6QQ2].
36. There
Were Orders to Follow, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2008),
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/04/opinion/04fri1.html?scp=9&sq=%22John+C.+Yoo%22
&st=nyt.
37. Will Bunch, Pa. Must Disbar War Criminal John Yoo—NOW!, PHILA. INQUIRER (May
7,
2009),
https://www.philly.com/philly/blogs/attytood/
Pennsylvania_and_Yoo_NOT_perfect_together.html; N.Y. Times Editorial Bd., Prosecute
Torturers
and
Their
Bosses,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
21,
2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/22/opinion/prosecute-torturers-and-their-bosses.
html;
Steve Sheppard, How the Torture Lawyers Broke the Law, and Why They Must Be Punished,
FINDLAW (Mar. 1, 2010), https://supreme.findlaw.com/legal-commentary/how-the-torturelawyers-broke-the-law-and-why-they-must-be-punished
.html
[https://perma.cc/2BHKGM8N]; Jon Wiener, Prosecute John Yoo, Says Law School Dean Erwin Chemerinsky, NATION
(Dec. 12, 2014), https://www. thenation.com/article/prosecute-john-yoo-says-law-school-deanerwin-chemerinsky/ [ht tps://perma.cc/B6H5-BH5C].
38. Sam Stein, Lawrence Wilkerson: Disbar the Bush Lawyers and Get a Special
Prosecutor for the Rest, HUFFINGTON POST (May 28, 2009), https://www.huffpost.com/
entry/lawrence-wilkerson-disbar_n_191755 [https://perma.cc/ Q4CP-XXNG].
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university administrators, and bar associations” going forward.39
But none of that ever happened. Instead, officials who held various roles in
the torture program went on to obtain more powerful and more insulated positions
in government, often with the support of elite Democratic lawyers. Consider the
case of Judge Jay Bybee. Bybee was an Assistant Attorney General who authored
a memo arguing that enhanced interrogation techniques did not amount to torture
unless the officer using enhanced interrogation specifically intended to cause
physical pain that is the “equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious
physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even
death.”40 The memo also maintained that Congress could not criminalize torture
because
the President’s powers as Commander in Chief gave the President the
constitutional authority to torture people in some circumstances.41
There were calls to punish Bybee for his role in authorizing the extreme and
cruel treatment of detainees.42 But a year after he authored the memo, Bybee was
nominated to be a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and
39. Paul Campos, How to Torture the Bush Six, DAILY BEAST (July 14, 2017),
https://www.thedailybeast.com/how-to-torture-the-bush-six [https://perma.cc/QB7Z-3GU9].
40. Memorandum from the Office of the Attorney Gen. to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel
to the President 1 (Aug. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Memorandum from the Office of the Attorney
Gen.], https://www.justice.gov/olc/file/ 886061/download [https://perma.cc/8YKE-YMNN];
On
the
Nomination
PN4:
Jay
S.
Bybee,
of
Nevada,
to
be United States Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit, GOVTRACK (Mar. 13, 2003)
[hereinafter On the Nomination PN4], http://www.govtrack.us/congress/ votes/108-2003/s54
[https://perma.cc/82AE-347W].
41. Memorandum from the Office of the Attorney Gen., supra note 40, at 31–39.
42. Martin Garbus, Disbar the Judge and the Lawyers, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 29,
2014),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/disbar-alberto-gonzales-torture-memos_b_
6391986?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&guce_ref
errer_sig=AQAAAE1FgDszBjN36j6MzaIWOj-RGUqsDW9xoewSwWcrWcCA
sTQ8DIBaJ2MkJO0VRXgG7xA5XTayzirOQtu1rp9EbMAxYswchwGJ-hknsaoW02
OZJDZjZ24levr23BrQ7XxBqhIdyBT6iT6WLouBaIA_va0IMrtT6Qec0S1wzfmritzP
[https://perma.cc/4F2X-9FRB]; Hilzoy, Disbar Them, WASH. MONTHLY (May 6, 2009),
https://washingtonmonthly.com/2009/05/06/disbar-them/ [https://perma.cc/N88R-PG NW].
Others called for him to be impeached. Bruce Ackerman, Impeach Jay Bybee, SLATE (Apr. 17,
2009), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2009/04/the-case-for-impeaching-jay-bybee.html
[https://perma.cc/6FQ5-F6YS]; Scott Horton, Impeach Jay Bybee, HARPER’S MAG. (Apr. 20,
2009), https://harpers.org/blog/2009/04/impeach-jay-bybee/ [https://perma.cc/BQP7-Q2PQ];
John Nichols, Begin by Impeaching the Torture Judge, NATION (Apr. 19, 2009),
https://www.thenation.com/article/begin-impeaching-torture-judge/ [https://perma.cc/SMW2M42N];
The
Torturers’
Manifesto,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
18,
2009),
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/19/opinion/19sun1.html?mtrref=
undefined&gwh=CBB00CFD6179CDD5991BA821CF23D44D&gwt=pay.
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the Senate confirmed him by a 74–19 vote.43 The “yea” votes included 26
Democratic senators, such as Senator Harry Reid (from Bybee’s home state of
Nevada) and Senator Patrick Leahy, who was in charge of judicial nominations for
the Democrats.44 The Senate received several letters in support of Bybee’s
nomination from self-identified Democrats; the letters often leveraged the authors’
progressive credentials in support of Bybee’s nomination.45 The letter writers also
stressed
the
authors’ membership in elite networks, such as academia.46 Bybee received letters
of support from Stuart Green, a self-identified “liberal Democrat and active
member of the ACLU,”47 and Democratic state senator Terry Care.48 The law firm
Latham & Watkins later provided Bybee free legal services to support his defense
on ethics charges.49
Bybee is not the only federal judge involved in the Administration’s response
to September 11. Justice Neil Gorsuch handled all terror litigation for the office of
the Assistant Attorney General in the Bush Administration.50 In the course of that
litigation, the office argued that the enhanced interrogation program was
unchallengeable in court.51 During the
43. On the Nomination PN4, supra note 40.
44. Henry Weinstein, Conservative Confirmed as 9th Circuit Judge, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 14,

2003), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2003-mar-14-me-bybee14-story.html.
45. See, e.g., Confirmation Hearings on Federal Appointments: Hearings Before the
Comm. on the Judiciary U.S. Senate, 108th Cong. 2–3 (2003) (statement from Orrin G. Hatch,
Senator).
46. See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 44.
47. Confirmation Hearings on Federal Appointments: Hearings Before the Comm. on the
Judiciary U.S. Senate, supra note 45, at 2–3.
48. Id. at 195; Sen. Terry Care, NEV. APPEAL (Jan. 9, 2007),
https://www.nevadaappeal.com/news/sen-terry-care/
[https://perma.cc/78X9-6CKX]
(explaining Nevada state Senator Terry Care).
49. Ian Millhiser, Corporate Law Firms Give Torture Judge Jay Bybee Over $3 Million
in Free Legal Services, THINKPROGRESS (Oct. 24, 2011), https://thinkprogress.org/corporatelaw-firms-give-torture-judge-jay-bybee-over-3-million-in-free-legal-services-ba1374e94eb0/
[https://perma.cc/86HW-QXPP]. Bybee was implicated in a 2009 report by the Office of
Professional Responsibility, which could have resulted in his disbarment. Nick Baumann, OPR:
Torture Lawyers Guilty of “Professional Misconduct”, MOTHER JONES (Feb. 19, 2010),
https://www.motherjones.com/crime-justice/2010/02/opr-torture-lawyers-guilty-professionalmisconduct/ [https://perma.cc/X24E-L5FD]. However, the Department of Justice refused to
adopt the conclusions of the report in 2010. Id.
50. Charlie Savage, Neil Gorsuch Helped Defend Disputed Bush-Era Terror Policies,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 2017/03/15/us/politics/neil-gorsuchtorture-guantanamo-bay.html?ref=politics&_r=0 [hereinafter Savage, Gorsuch].
51. They argued, “[C]ourts should not undertake ‘the task of balancing individual rights
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course of his tenure in the Executive Branch, Gorsuch added a notation that torture
works on a memo about the Administration’s enhanced interrogation techniques52
and put a big X next to a note about whether the Administration should apply the
Geneva protections against torture to persons who were detained in connection
with the war on terror.53 (The Administration would later unsuccessfully argue that
the Geneva conventions should not apply to those detainees.)54 And after visiting
Guantanamo Bay, Gorsuch wrote a letter saying he was “extraordinarily
impressed” with the facilities and that the generals have “developed standards and
imposed a degree of professionalism that the nation can be proud of.”55
When Gorsuch was nominated to the Supreme Court, Neal Katyal, who
argued and won one of the detainee-treatment cases, wrote an op-ed in the New
York Times, urging the Senate to confirm Gorsuch.56 Katyal subsequently
introduced Gorsuch in his confirmation hearing.57 Gorsuch’s former law clerks
against national-security concerns’ unless the political branches . . . have determined that
‘judicial oversight is appropriate.’” Defendant’s and the United States’ Motion to Dismiss, Ali
v. Rumsfeld, 479 F. Supp. 2d 85 (D.D.C. 2007) (No. 05-1378 (TFH)), 2006 WL 1032554, at
*9. See Brief for Defendant-Appellants, Doe v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2006) (No. 054896-CV), 2005 WL 6237672, at *34–36 (“At a fundamental level, the district court’s opinion
reflects an unwarranted reluctance to give weight to reasoned judgments of the Executive
Branch regarding the risks associated with the disclosures about secret intelligence gathering
activities. . . . To dismiss the carefully considered judgments presented by the government in
this case as mere ‘speculation,’ and to replace those judgments with the court’s own conclusion
that disclosure would not be harmful, is to make the judiciary rather than the Executive
Branch the arbiter of this country’s intelligence gathering needs. That is a role the judiciary is
institutionally unsuited to play.”).
52. Robert Barnes & Ed O’Keefe, Senate Democrats Focus on Gorsuch’s Defense of
Bush-Era Terrorism Policies, WASH. POST (Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.washington
post.com/national/senate-democrats-focus-on-gorsuchs-defense-of-bush-era-terrorismpolicies/2017/03/15/3fced3de-0998-11e7-93dc-00f9bdd7
4ed1_story.html?utm_term=.052123953456/.
53. See Jennifer Daskal, Questions for Judge Gorsuch, JUST SECURITY (Mar. 16, 2017),
https://www.justsecurity.org/38876/questions-judge-gorsuch/
[https://perma.cc/
BMS5L8MY].
54. Id.
55. Letter from Neil M. Gorsuch to General Jay W. Hood (Nov. 17, 2005),
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/3522197-Gorsuch-DOJ-War-on-TerrorDocuments.html#document/p1 [https://perma.cc/4MJW-3LBW].
56. Neal Katyal, Why Liberals Should Back Neil Gorsuch, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/31/opinion/why-liberals-should-back-neilgorsuch.html?_r=0.
57. Neal Katyal, Professor of Law, Georgetown Univ., Introduction of Judge Neil
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wrote to the Senate on his behalf; the letter stressed that
the clerks’ “political views span the spectrum, and among [them], you will
find differing views on how the Senate handled the nomination of Judge Merrick
Garland.”58
It is important to caveat this case study by making clear what I am
not saying: The lawyers involved in the torture programs were not
bad lawyers, and their participation in the torture programs did not mean that they
were
incapable
of
principled
decision-making.
As
a
judge,
Judge Jay Bybee has (correctly) ruled against the Trump Administration
in a challenge to President Trump’s executive order that purports to prohibit
migrants from asserting asylum claims if they do not enter the
country through ports of entry.59 And Justice Gorsuch voted with his more liberal
colleagues to form 5–4 majorities in several significant (though
not high profile) criminal law and Native American law cases that were
not otherwise particularly ideologically salient.60
The lawyers’ participation in the torture programs is significant because it
raises
questions
about
whether
there
are
certain
actions
that would disqualify elite lawyers from future government service
in the eyes of their fellow lawyers.61 There were probably other competent,
Gorsuch to the Senate Judiciary Committee (Mar. 20, 2017), https://www.judiciary.
senate.gov/download/03-20-17-katyal-introduction [https://perma.cc/D3YG-59KL].
58. David Lat, Liberals and Gays for Gorsuch? (Or, the Virtues of Non-Ideological Clerk
Hiring), ABOVE L. (Feb. 15, 2017), https://abovethelaw.com/2017/02/liberals-and-gays-forgorsuch-or-the-virtues-of-non-ideological-clerk-hiring/2/ [https://perma.cc/ 7HXM-S5HE].
His female law clerks wrote a separate letter after a former student
questioned his commitment to gender equity. Letter from Former Gorsuch Clerks, to Charles E.
Grassley, Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary, and Dianne Feinstein, Ranking Member, Comm.
on
the
Judiciary
(Mar.
20,
2017),
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/
media/doc/Former%20Female%20Law%20Clerks.pdf [https://perma.cc/6BTR-PVCK].
59. E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 909 F.3d 1219, 1231 (9th Cir.), superseded by
932 F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 2018).
60. See, e.g., Herrera v. Wyoming, 139 S. Ct. 1686, 1688 (2019); Wash. State Dep’t of
Licensing v. Cougar Den, 139 S. Ct. 1000, 1016 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring); United States
v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 2372 (2019); United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2322
(2019); Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1233–34 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
61. For a comparison, consider what several Democratic nominees have been punished
for. Dawn Johnsen’s nomination to the Office of Legal Counsel was withdrawn after her
arguments in support of a woman’s constitutional right to end a pregnancy came under critical
scrutiny. Charlie Savage, Obama Nominee to Legal Office Withdraws, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9,
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principled Republicans who did not participate in or enable the United
States’ torture program who could have been selected as nominees.62 But the
lawyers’ participation in the torture program was not viewed as disqualifying,
including by the other elite lawyers who continued to support them.63
The elite network of lawyers may not ultimately have the power
to sway senators’ votes on a particular nominee. But bipartisan support provides
senators
cover
to
vote
for
a
nominee,
especially
relative
to nominations that involve polarized opposition and criticism.64 Bipartisan
support also minimizes the time, resources, and political capital
that an administration or a vulnerable senator would have to devote to

2010),
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/10/us/politics/10johnsen.html?
mtrref=en.wikipedia.org&gwh=258D635098F562B7B69B1B12992E1ECB&gwt=pay&asset
Type=REGIWALL – Dawn Johnsen. Debo Adegbile’s nomination to the Justice Department’s
Civil Rights Division was withdrawn because of his pro bono work on behalf of a criminal
defendant. See Josh Gerstein, Obama’s Civil Rights Nominee Withdraws, POLITICO (Sept. 15,
2014), https://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2014/09/obamas-civil-rights-nomineewithdraws-195512 [https://perma.cc/EFN8-QZCB].
62. There were certainly less competent and less principled people to nominate for these
positions who did not participate in or enable the United States’ torture program.
Natasha Bertrand, Gina Haspel’s Lose-Lose Proposition for Democrats, ATLANTIC (May 7,
2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/05/gina-haspels-lose-loseproposition-for-democrats/559826/ (noting Democrats’ fears in the context of Gina Haspel).
Gina Haspel, for example, was confirmed as director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Miriam Khan, Senate Votes to Confirm Gina Haspel as Next CIA Director, ABC NEWS (May
17,
2018),
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/senate-votes-confirm-gina-hospel-ciadirector/story?id=55240031 [https://perma.cc/E8M5-XBST]. “Haspel oversaw a CIA black site
in Thailand where two terrorism suspects were tortured, and her name was on a cable that
ordered the videotapes of their interrogations to be destroyed in 2005.” Bertrand, supra. Fiftyfour Senators voted for her confirmation, including Democratic Senators Mark Warner and
Jeanne Shaheen. Khan, supra. Jeremy Bash, the “Democratic chief counsel to the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and chief of staff at the CIA and the Department
of Defense under President Obama,” penned an op-ed in support of her nomination. Jeremy
Bash, Gina Haspel Is the Rare CIA Director Nominee That Both Parties Should Love, NBC
(May 2, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/gina-haspel-rare-cia-directornominee-both-parties-should-love-ncna870716 [https://perma.cc/2MYX-ZB73]. But some
Democrats feared the prospect of a CIA director who lacked any training in intelligence and
was merely a friend of the President. See Bertrand, supra.
63. See supra notes 43–58.
64. Patrick Gregory, Trump’s First Black Female Judicial Nominee a Bipartisan Pick,
BLOOMBERG L. (May 20, 2019), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/trumps-firstblack-female-judicial-nominee-a-bipartisan-pick [https://perma.cc/ 5JSD-Q4LT].
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a particular nominee.65 And at a minimum, the networks could impose
the social cost of a lack of support from one’s own social and professional
network. Some administrations even rely on particular networks to
identify nominees for positions,66 which means the networks can decide
what disqualifies someone from future appointments.
III. FAMILY SEPARATIONS
The case studies of the officials involved in the enhanced interrogation
program raise questions about whether any Trump Administration official will
suffer long-term professional costs for participating in or defending the
Administration’s forcible separation of families, among other policies.
By now, the contours of the Administration’s family-separation policy are
clear. President Trump and then-Chief of Staff John Kelly, together with thenAttorney General Jeff Sessions, publicly floated the prospect of forcibly separating
families in order to deter migrants from attempting to enter the United States
(including migrants who are entitled to asylum).67 The Administration ultimately
chose to institute a “zero tolerance” policy to effectuate family separations and
deter migration.68 Under the zero tolerance policy, the Administration criminally
prosecuted anyone who crossed the border (including persons whose asylum
claims had not yet been processed or rejected).69
The zero tolerance policy resulted in family separations because the
Department of Justice (DOJ) conducts criminal prosecutions rather than the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which polices the border and detains

65. See, e.g., id. (noting how Democratic support from outside the Senate will ease burden
of judicial confirmation).
66. See LEVINSON & BALKIN, supra note 3, at 131; Dylan Matthews & Byrd Pinkerton,
The Incredible Influence of the Federalist Society, Explained, VOX (June 3, 2019),
https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2019/6/3/18632438/federalist-society-leonard -leo-brettkavanaugh [https://perma.cc/UN7U-NARF]; Robert O’Harrow Jr. & Shawn Boburg, A
Conservative Activist’s Behind-the-Scenes Campaign to Remake the Nation’s Courts, WASH.
POST (May 21, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ graphics/2019/investigations/leonardleo-federalists-society-courts/; What Is the Federal Society and How Does It Affect Supreme
Court Picks?, NPR (June 28, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/06/28/624416666/what-is-thefederalist-society-and-how-does-it-affect-supreme-court-picks [https://perma.cc/C898-47VU].
67. See id. (cataloguing evidence of the Trump Administration’s consideration of its
family-separation policy).
68. Leah Litman & Hilary Robin Rosenthal, Immigration Policy Parallels, TAKE CARE
(May 20, 2019), http://takecareblog.com/blog/immigration-policy-parallels.
69. Id.
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persons during the course of immigration proceedings.70 The
criminal prosecutions therefore “separated” parents from their children
because the parents were (temporarily) placed in the custody of the DOJ while
their children remained in the custody of the DHS.71 The Administration
maintained that when the DOJ took a parent into its custody (and out of DHS
custody), the parent’s child became legally “unaccompanied,” since the child was
in DHS custody and the parent was not.72 Under the relevant statutes, an
unaccompanied minor must be placed in the custody of the Office of Refugee
Resettlement (ORR), which is within the Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS), rather than the DHS.73 As a result, once the parent returned to
DHS custody (even after only a brief time in DOJ custody), the parent and child
would be separated and in the custody of two different government agencies.74
In other writings, I have debunked the argument that children who cross the
border with their parents are unaccompanied for purposes of
the relevant
statutes that would allow ORR to take custody of them.75 Other legal scholars have
likewise
discredited
other
arguments
that
the
Administration is making in support of family separations.76 District courts have
70. See id.
71. Id.
72. Id. This included even temporary changes in custody, such as when the parent attended

a hearing on the unlawful-entry charge or was being transported to that bearing. Id. The
Administration also maintained that placing a parent in DHS custody meant a child was
unaccompanied. See Marty Lederman, Deborah Pearlstein & Ryan Goodman, Unpacking
DOJ’s New Claim That DHS Can Legally Detain Migrant Children with Their Parents for
Longer
than
Twenty
Days,
JUST
SECURITY
(July
6,
2018),
https://www.justsecurity.org/59046/unpacking-dojs-claim-dhs-legally-detain-migrantchildren-parents-longer-twenty-days/ [https://perma.cc/GBP8-WZ98].
73. About the Program, OFF. REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT, https://www.acf.hhs.gov/
orr/programs/ucs/about [https://perma.cc/W9ZF-N557]; Leah Litman, How Trump Corrupts
the Rule of Law, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2018) [hereinafter Litman, How Trump Corrupts the
Rule of Law], https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/18/ opinion/trump-zero-toleranceborder.html.
74. Litman, How Trump Corrupts the Rule of Law, supra note 73.
75. Id.; Leah Litman, Forced Separation of Families & Forced to-Term Pregnancies,
TAKE CARE (June 7, 2018), https://takecareblog.com/blog/forced-separation-of-families-andforced-to-term-pregnancies; Leah Litman, Immigration Sins of the Past & the Forced
Separation of Families, TAKE CARE (June 4, 2018), https://takecareblog.com/blog/
immigration-sins-of-the-past-and-the-forced-separation-of-families; Leah Litman, Law and
Farce: The Forced Separation of Families, TAKE CARE (June 5, 2018),
https://takecareblog.com/blog/law-and-farce-the-forced-separation-of-families.
76. Marty Lederman, Deborah Pearlstein & Ryan Goodman, Unpacking DOJ’s New
Claim That DHS Can Legally Detain Migrant Children with Their Parents for Longer than
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issued compelling and scathing opinions finding the Administration’s family
separations unlawful.77 Even if the family separations are lawful, however, there
is no serious question of whether they affect serious and long-term psychological
and emotional costs on the families who are separated (even temporarily).
There have been calls to punish or shun any government official involved in
the moral travesty of family separations.78 In light of what happened to the officials
involved in the torture program, that probably will not happen.79 Some protesters
may occasionally yell at Kirstjen Nielsen in restaurants.80 But that will stop at some
point.
Indeed, there are already signs that the lawyers involved in the forced
separation of families will be welcomed back into the fold. One of the lawyers
involved in family separations has already been promoted.81 Before he was
confirmed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Judge Chad Readler
was the Assistant Attorney General whose name is on all of the briefs defending
the forced separation of families.82 The vote to confirm Readler was along party
lines.83
But
elite
lawyers
did
not
uniformly
oppose
Readler,84 and his defense of the forced separation of families was
Twenty Days, JUST SECURITY (July 6, 2018), https:// www.justsecurity.org/
59046/unpacking-dojs-claim-dhs-legally-detain-migrant-children-parents-longer-twenty
days/ [https://perma.cc/9BSE-T643].
77. Ms. L. v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 310 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1144 (S.D. Cal.
2018) (“The unfortunate reality is that under the present system migrant children are not
accounted for with the same efficiency and accuracy as property. Certainly, that cannot satisfy
the requirements of due process.”).
78. Michelle Goldberg, Cancel Kirstjen Nielsen, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2019), https://
www.nytimes.com/2019/04/08/opinion/kirstjen-nielsen-family-separation-trump.html.
79. See supra Part II.
80. Sarah Mervosh, Kirstjen Nielsen Is Confronted by Protesters at Mexican Restaurant:
‘Shame!’, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/ 2018/06/20/us/kirstjennielsen-protesters-restaurant.html.
81. See, e.g., Roll Call Vote 116th Congress-1st Session, U.S. SENATE (Mar. 6, 2019),
https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=116&
session=1&vote=00037 [https://perma.cc/YV6S-6YGP].
82. Id.
83. Id. Susan Collins was apparently allowed to cast an inconsequential no. See id.
84. See, e.g., Eric Heisig, Abortions, the Muslim Ban and Other Controversial Cases of
Trump’s Ohio Nominees for a Federal Appeals Court, CLEVELAND.COM (June 18,
2018),
https://www.cleveland.com/news/erry-2018/06/7003c9e82e5691/abortions_the_
muslim_ban_and_o.html [https://perma.cc/Z7G6-ZKM6] (“‘We say all parties under our legal
system are entitled to balanced representation. That requires attorneys that are willing to take
positions they do or do not agree with,’ Adler said. ‘The system can’t work if we assume that
attorneys agree with their clients.’”).
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not enough to disqualify him from a judicial appointment with lifetime tenure.85
IV. LAWYERS AND DEMOCRATIC DYSFUNCTION
The idea that elite lawyers should professionally sanction other elite lawyers
who participate in the breakdown of important constitutional norms involves
difficult line-drawing issues. Of course lawyers should not be penalized for
defending any policy that pushes a line or that attempts to change the law. And of
course lawyers should not demonize other lawyers merely because they disagree
on some issues.
But some things have to be enough to warrant approbation, even within the
network of elite lawyers. Lawyers are already sanctioned for myriad things that
they do in the course of being a lawyer. Lawyers cannot suborn perjury.86 They
cannot conceal evidence.87 They cannot commit securities fraud, even in the course
of representing a client.88 And that is just a partial list.89 So it is not as if lawyers
get a pass for anything they might do in the course of representing a client.
Why is enabling racist and cruel family separations not on the prohibited list
of actions? Why does enabling family separations not suffice as a reason to
disqualify someone from future government service? The Administration’s
85. Readler was also involved in some of the Administration’s other legally questionable
policies. He defended the Administration’s ability to prevent undocumented minor women in
its custody from having abortions (even when the women became pregnant as a result of rape
and threatened to harm themselves if they could not have an abortion). Defendant’s Motion for
Briefing on Class Wide Relief and Stay Pending Supreme Court Proceedings, Garza v. Hargan,
No. 17-CV-02122 (TSC) (D.D.C. Nov. 3, 2017); see generally Garza v. Hargan, C.R. LITIG.
CLEARINGHOUSE, https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=16228 [https://perma.cc/6474BDDN] (providing links to other briefs signed by Readler in the Garza case). He also made
both the claim that the now-unenforceable minimum coverage requirement is unconstitutional
and the legally outlandish claim that the rest of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) must be
invalidated as a result. Fed. Defendants’ Memorandum in Response to Plaintiffs’ Application
for Preliminary Injunction, Texas v. United States, 340 F. Supp. 3d 579 (N.D. Tex. 2018) (No.
4:18-cv-00167-O), 2018 WL 2750077. Readler’s participation in the ACA litigation, and not
his facilitation of the forced separation of families, apparently caused Senator Susan Collins
(R–ME) to cast her inconsequential vote against his confirmation. See Senator Collins to
Oppose Administration’s Judicial Nominee to 6th Circuit Court of Appeals, SUSAN COLLINS:
U.S. SENATOR ME. (Mar. 5, 2019), https://www.collins.senate.gov/newsroom/senator-collinsoppose-administration
%E2%80%99s-judicial-nominee-6th-circuit-court-appeals
[https://perma.cc/U5NA-4AY9].
86. See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
87. Id. at r. 3.4.
88. See id. at r. 1.6.
89. See id.
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forcible separation of families has little basis in the law, it has no appreciable
deterrent effect on border crossings, and, most importantly, it works unspeakable
pain and cruelty on the individuals affected.90
If lawyers are not even willing to speak out against lawyers who are involved
in the forced separation of families, then they will not speak out against lawyers
who are involved in less morally abhorrent policies that nonetheless facilitate
significant breakdowns in our constitutional order. Think of other policies that
lawyers have been involved in because of their service in the Trump
Administration. Lawyers were involved in allegedly covering up the purpose of
adding a citizenship question to the census;91 lawyers continue to serve in an
Administration that threatens to prosecute its political opponents and
“send . . . back”
a
black,
American
congresswoman who is a naturalized citizen and refugee;92 lawyers continue to
serve after the President maintained that there were “very fine” people on the neoNazi side of a Charlottesville rally that killed a young woman;93 lawyers continue
to serve after the President questioned the assessments of the intelligence
90. In fiscal year 2018, Customs and Border Protection apprehended 396,579 individuals
crossing the southwestern border. Total Illegal Alien Apprehension by Fiscal Year, U.S.
CUSTOMS
&
BORDER
PROTECTION,
https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/
assets/documents/2019-Mar/bp-southwest-border-sector-apps-fy1960-fy2018.pdf
[https:
//perma.cc/4Y2E-JDNN]. Only 10 months into fiscal year 2019, Customs and Border Protection
had already apprehended 760,370 individuals crossing the southwestern border. Southwest
Border
Migration
FY
2019,
U.S.
CUSTOMS
&
BORDER
PROTECTION,
https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/sw-border-migration/fy-2019 [https://perma.cc/ ZXQ65DFV].
91. See, e.g., Hansi Lo Wang, Trump Officials Face Cover-up Allegations After Failed
Citizenship
Question
Push,
NPR
(July
16,
2019),
https://www.npr.org/
2019/07/16/742259233/trump-officials-face-cover-up-allegations-after-failed-citizenshipquestion-push [https://perma.cc/BS4Y-CPVQ]. Some government lawyers seemed willing to
disavow the government’s prior representations in court about the timing of the census. Hansi
Lo Wang, Judge Says Administration Can’t Change Lawyers in Census Citizenship Question
Case, NPR (July 7, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/07/07/ 739369416/justice-departmentchanges-legal-team-behind-census-citizenship-question-case [https://perma.cc/HPG4-JSYN].
92. Rebecca Morin, Ilhan Omar Trolls Trump with Tweet About Africa Visit, Weeks After
‘Send Her Back’ Chant, USA TODAY (Aug. 1, 2019), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/news/politics/2019/08/01/send-her-back-ilhan-omar-trolls-trump-post-africa-visit/
1895486001/; Jonathan Allen, Trump Turns the Full Force of the Government on Perceived
Political Enemies, NBC NEWS (May 24, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/ politics/whitehouse/trump-turns-full-force-government-perceived-political-enemies-n1010096
[https://perma.cc/MQ36-WSPZ].
93. See Rosie Gray, Trump Defends White-Nationalist Protestors: ‘Some Very Fine
People on Both Sides’, ATLANTIC (Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/
archive/2017/08/trump-defends-white-nationalist-protesters-some-very-fine-people-on-bothsides/537012/.
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community about Russia’s interference in the election;94 lawyers continue to serve
after the President took various actions to undermine the counterintelligence
investigation into Russian interference in the election;95 lawyers continue to serve
after the President described a variety of African, South American, and Central
American countries as “shithole countries” (and restricted immigration from those
countries),96 and so on.
Lawyers have also (reportedly) been involved in covering up President
Trump’s serious, antidemocratic breaches of his constitutional obligations and
office. After the President asked the Ukrainian President to investigate his political
opponent’s son, lawyers directed White House officials to place records of the call
on secret, classified servers—even though the call contained no classified
information.97 The call merely contained something that was politically
embarrassing to the President and deeply destructive to our constitutional
democracy.98 Apparently, White House lawyers sought to keep secret several other
presidential
conversations,
including
one
in
which
the President told the Russian government that he was fine with their interference
in the 2016 election, which benefited him.99
Lawyers can communicate their opposition to government misconduct
through noisy withdrawals or resignations.100 But there were no withdrawals or
resignations when the Administration started separating families. Nor were there
94. See Peter Baker & Michael Crowley, Trump and Putin Share Joke About Election
Meddling,
Sparking
New
Furor,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
28,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/28/us/politics/trump-putin-election.html.
95. 2 SPECIAL COUNSEL ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO
RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 3–7 (Mar.
2019), https://www.justice.gov/storage/report_volume2.pdf [https://perma.cc/F5AL-SWJ8].
96. See Eli Watkins & Abby Phillip, Trump Decries Immigrants from ‘Shithole Countries’
Coming to US, CNN (Jan. 12, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/ 2018/01/11/politics/immigrantsshithole-countries-trump/index.html [https://perma.cc/ 7LJ8-4JUV].
97. Letter from Whistleblower, supra note 30.
98. See id.
99. Shane Harris, Josh Dawsey & Ellen Nakashima, Trump Told Russian Officials in 2017
He Wasn’t Concerned About Moscow’s Interference in U.S. Election, WASH. POST (Sept. 27,
2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/trump-told-russian-officials-in2017-he-wasnt-concerned-about-moscows-interference-in-us-election/2019/ 09/27/b20a8bc8e159-11e9-b199-f638bf2c340f_story.html.
100. See C. Ryan Barber, ‘A Very Difficult Time’: Challenges for Career Lawyers at
Trump’s DOJ, LAW.COM (July 15, 2019), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/
2019/07/15/a-very-difficult-time-challenges-for-career-lawyers-at-trumps-doj/
[https://
perma.cc/P7AF-RBZ5]; Josh Gerstein, Justice Department Attorney Resigns After Legal Shift
on Obamacare, POLITICO (June 12, 2018), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/
06/12/obamacare-justice-department-resign-642992 [https://perma.cc/SY2J-NKTZ].
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withdrawals after the President praised the neo-Nazi side of a rally at which a
young woman was killed. And if going along with the destruction of whatever
norm there was against supporting neo-Nazis does not carry any consequences,
then there will probably not be any consequences when lawyers help break down
more seemingly mundane and procedural norms that are nonetheless important to
the orderly functioning of a system of constitutional government. Lawyers are
challenging the idea that presidents can be investigated for breaking the law101 and
are allegedly helping the President cover up potentially impeachable conduct,102
among other things.
When critics accuse lawyers of enabling government misconduct, one
common defense is to insist there is space between the lawyer’s views and the
client’s.103 It is true, of course, that government lawyers do not necessarily believe
all of the positions they argue for as government lawyers, and it is also important
to ensure that the government is vigorously represented. But there is no norm in
the United States that lawyers must accept every client who approaches them, at
least outside the context of criminal defense.104 Nor is there a norm that lawyers
must advance every argument in support of a client or defend every decision their
client wants (again, outside the context of criminal defense and in the particular
setting of civil government representation).105
There are, by contrast, norms (and even bar rules) to that effect in other
countries. The United Kingdom generally requires lawyers to accept professional
clients’ instructions under the “cab-rank” rule.106 Under that rule, if a lawyer
“receive[s] instructions from a professional client”107 and the “instructions are
appropriate taking into account” the lawyer’s “experience, seniority, and/or field
101. See, e.g., Igor Derysh, Trump’s New Argument: He’s Immune from All Criminal
Investigation in New Tax Return Lawsuit, SALON (Sept. 21, 2019, 11:00 AM),
https://www.salon.com/2019/09/21/trumps-new-argument-hes-immune-from-all-criminalinvestigation-in-new-tax-return-lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/CL46-CJEC].
102. Harris, Dawsey & Nakashima, supra note 99; Letter from Whistleblower, supra note
30.
103. See Savage, Gorsuch, supra note 50.
104. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.18 (AM. BAR. ASS’N 1983).
105. See id. at r. 3.1, 3.3.
106. BAR STANDARDS BD., THE BAR STANDARDS HANDBOOK 44 (4th ed. 2019).
107. A professional client is any client in a regulated industry. Id. at 247. This encompasses
many different industries in the United Kingdom, including healthcare, education, law, finance,
maritime officers, engineers, various security jobs, and various transport jobs. Professions
Regulated by Law or Public Authority, CENTRE PROF. QUALIFICATIONS,
https://www.naric.org.uk/cpq/eu%20citizens/coming%20into%20the
%20uk/Regulated%20Professions/Professions%20Regulated%20by%20Law%20or%20Public
%20Authority.aspx [https://perma.cc/UDZ3-D4TS].
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of practice,” then the lawyer “must . . . accept the instructions, irrespective of” the
client’s identity, the nature of the case, whether the client is paying privately or
publicly, or “any belief or opinion” the lawyer has regarding “the character,
reputation, cause, conduct, guilt or innocence of the client.”108 A lawyer can only
refuse when there is one of the following: a conflict of interest, a likelihood of
breaching client confidentiality, an instruction to go against the law or code of
ethics, a conflicting prior commitment, a potential liability for professional
negligence that exceeds the scope of the amount available under malpractice
insurance, a client that will not pay, a client that represents an unreasonable credit
risk, or a belief that the lawyer cannot competently represent the client.109
The United States has no similar rule. Outside the criminal context, lawyers
can choose whether to represent particular clients.110 Nothing
obligates lawyers to provide their services to anyone who asks for them, and
nothing obligates lawyers to continue with particular representations or follow
through with particular client directives.111
At some point, it probably should not matter if the lawyers who are enabling
the forcible separation of families or helping the President invite foreign
interference in an election would personally like to see those things happen. What
matters is that they are making it easier for those things to happen. Their
professional skills and credentials are being leveraged to defend those policies, and
their presence in government gives the government’s policies more credibility and
authority than they would otherwise have.
Most importantly, if we do not want families to be separated, detainees to be
tortured, or foreign governments interfering in our elections, then there need to be
professional costs for the people who help the government do those things—
including losing out on the opportunity for future government appointments. That
is how deterrence works: There is a penalty for engaging in certain conduct, and
that penalty deters others from doing the same thing. Here, it would mean that
when you abuse a government office, you do not get to be in government office

108. BAR STANDARDS BD., supra note 106, at 44 (emphasis added) (citing rule rC29, the
cab-rank rule).
109. Id. at 38, 39, 44, 45.
110. See Duncan Kennedy, The Responsibility of Lawyers for the Justice of Their Causes,
18 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1157, 1158 (1987) (“Your cases are yours to choose on any basis you
want.”). For an argument that this choice involves a moral dimension, see Monroe Freedman,
The Lawyer’s Moral Obligation of Justification, 74 TEX. L. REV. 111, 112 (1995).
111. Kennedy, supra note 110, at 1158 (arguing lawyers “should feel guilty, and [society]
should disapprove of [them], if [they] go ahead and argue a case [they] think will do more harm
than good.”).
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again.112
Of course, there is something painful and unpleasant about making life
uncomfortable for someone familiar, especially a professional colleague. There is
also something deeply uncomfortable about calling out someone you know for
immoral conduct. But our constitutional order depends on people doing just that.
Scholars have identified professional networks as important guardians of norms:
Government officials and elites abide by norms in part because they fear
approbation or repudiation by their professional and social networks if they do
not.113 Yet those networks are now sending the signal that their members have
nothing to fear at all—because they will never be held accountable for participating
in cruel and destructive policies.114
That does not mean elite lawyers’ support for one another caused the
dysfunction that Balkin and Levinson observe.115 Elite lawyers supported each
other’s careers before the rise of the kind of dysfunction that Balkin and Levinson
document. But the state of the legal profession makes lawyers unable or unwilling
to stop the kind of dysfunction they observe; instead, the lawyers contribute to it.
In particular, lawyers’ seemingly boundless commitment to supporting lawyers on
both sides, and the related commitment to giving lawyers a pass for what they do
in government, may be just fine when neither side is arguing for morally abhorrent
policies or the destruction of democratic processes. But those commitments have
pernicious effects when one side, while in government office, seeks to make
112. Cf. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation
of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO L.J. 949 (2003).
113. Political scientists emphasized the existence of “sanctions” (broadly defined) as a way
to identify norms. Julia R. Azari & Jennifer K. Smith, Unwritten Rules: Informal Institutions in
Established Democracies, 10 PERSP. ON POL. 37, 40 (2012); Daphna Renan, Presidential Norms
and Article II, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2187, 2204 (2018) (identifying “institutional reinforcements”
as a way of supplying force to norms); id. (“Structural norms constrain behavior . . . [because
an actor] might seek to avoid the disapproval or sanction of other actors who accept [a norm].”);
id. at 2205 (“[S]tructural norms tend to be preserved—and norm breaches sanctioned—not in
the main through electoral politics, but through . . . institutional surroundings. The
norms . . . will be more salient to elite political, professional, and social networks than to most
voters most of the time.”); id. at 2279 (“[P]luralist norm enforcers, drawing on the soft powers
of . . . civil society . . . have made some norms of the presidency more resilient than others.”);
id. (“Administrative actors also have developed prophylactic procedures . . . to sanction norm
breaching . . . . So too, when a range of participants in the practice can be sanctioned for norm
breaching (professionally or otherwise), the structural norm may be more resilient.”); id. at
2279–80 (“Civil society actors similarly police presidential norms . . . . Other legal elites,
including those in the academy, have long played a role articulating and critiquing the
norms . . . .”).
114. See supra Part II.
115. See LEVINSON & BALKIN, supra note 3, at 136–37.
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elections less democratic and to carry out the separation of families.116
The idea that there is something untoward about calling someone a racist or
a fascist117 appears in constitutional jurisprudence as well as in the behavior of
lawyers.118 And if it is concerning in constitutional jurisprudence (as many scholars
have suggested it is), then it should be concerning in the behavior of networks
too.119 Consider, for example, the Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County v.
Holder.120 Shelby County invalidated the statutory provision that gave life to
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), which required states with histories of
racial discrimination to preclear any changes to their voting laws.121 The Court
invalidated the VRA provision in part because of the Court’s apparent misgivings
about being too hard on the U.S. South for its history of state-sponsored terrorism
and violence against racial minorities.122 The Court has also limited federal courts’
ability to oversee the desegregation of public schools on the ground that it is unfair
to hold districts responsible for actions that occurred more than a decade ago (the
time it takes one child to complete elementary through high school).123 And the
Court has created an extremely high threshold for concluding government officials
discriminated on the basis of race,124 emphasizing the need to presume that states
are acting out of good motives, since a conclusion that they acted out of bad

116. See, e.g., David Pozen, The Shrinking Constitution of Settlement, BALKINIZATION
(May
6,
2019),
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2019/05/the-shrinking-constitution-ofsettlement.html [https://perma.cc/V5XN-L522]. Levinson has elaborated on a similar idea in a
recent piece with Mark Graber about how traditional constitutional interpretation may not be
well-suited to addressing officeholders who are unsuited or unfit for the constitutional office
they hold. See Sanford Levinson & Mark Graber, The Constitutional Powers of AntiPublian
Presidents: Constitutional Interpretation in a Broken Constitutional Order, 21 CHAP. L. REV.
133, 138–39 (2018). In that piece, the authors offer a partial critique of certain forms of legal
analysis as insufficiently attuned to—and not having the vocabulary to assess—substantive
decisions and morality, although they also describe how legal doctrine has been responsive to
these calculations. See id. at 138, 154–64.
117. Leah Litman, In Tribute: Justice Anthony Kennedy, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1, 22 (2018).
118. That is unsurprising insofar as the people who are a part of the network of elite lawyers
are also the people who shape constitutional jurisprudence.
119. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Foreword: Equality Divided, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1, 92–93
(2013).
120. Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
121. Id. at 535, 557.
122. See id. at 552–56.
123. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 752 (1974). A desegregation decree should be
dissolved “after the local authorities have operated in compliance with it for a reasonable period
of time.” Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Sch. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 248 (1991).
124. See Jessica A. Clarke, Explicit Bias, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 505, 535 (2018).
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motives would be unfairly harsh.125
These judicial decisions have the same untoward effects as the networks’
unwillingness to sanction lawyers who engage in norm-breaking conduct. That is
why scholars have identified these decisions as cause for concern: By making it
difficult to call out government officials who participate in the destruction or
violation of any given norm, these decisions, together with the elite network of
lawyers, protect government officials who participate in the destruction of norms
that are integral to a healthy constitutional democracy.
The judicial decisions that express concern about identifying government
officials as racist provide some reasons for their reluctance, such as the limited
fact-finding capacity of the federal courts, the federal courts’ relative expertise in
certain areas, or the judicial deference that is due to the political branches.126 But
these justifications do not explain why professional and social networks are
unwilling to hold their members responsible for facilitating the breakdown of some
constitutional norm. And the networks’ failure to hold their members accountable
is just as bad for our constitutional order as the federal courts’ unwillingness to
call out racism or other antidemocratic actions. By eliminating one important
mechanism for policing norms, the unconditional loyalty within the elite network
of lawyers contributes to the kind of dysfunction that Balkin and Levinson’s book
concerns.127

125. See Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2324–27 (2018). Another mechanism the Court
and commentators have used is adopting a narrow definition of what constitutes racism,
sometimes with reference to historical examples, such as slavery or Jim Crow. See Shelby
County, 570 U.S. at 547 (“Nearly 50 years later, things have changed dramatically.”); see also
Helen Klein Murillo & Leah Litman, What Does It Mean to Be Pro-LGBT?, TAKE CARE (Aug.
27, 2017), https://takecareblog.com/blog/what-does-it-mean-to-be-pro-lgbt; Kyle Skinner &
Leah
Litman,
The
Long-Term
Costs
of
Trump’s
Racism, TAKE CARE (Aug. 6, 2019), https://takecareblog.com/blog/the-long-term-costs-oftrump-s-racism.
126. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2409, 2419 (2018).
127. Cf. CHARLES TILLY, DEMOCRACY 39 (2007) (“[R]apid de-democratization resulted
not from popular disaffection with democracy but chiefly from elite defection.”).

